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His focus is an examination of the development and potential of the Japanese
navy in the context of the U.S.-Japan
Defense Security Alliance.
Rising from the ashes of World War II to
become a legitimate regional power, Japan has developed the “second most
powerful naval force in the world’s largest ocean.” This has led the United States
and others to press Japan to contribute
more to the security of the democratic
and free-trading world, while its neighbors closely watch for signs of militarism
that would signal resurgent nationalism
and imperialism.
Through comparative analysis, Woolley
presents the development of the Japan
Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF),
and the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF)
generally, in decision-making models developed within each of the book’s seven
chapters. He sees the efficacy of Japan’s
military might and fear of its potency as
catalysts that will awaken the long-dormant
Japanese aim for regional hegemony and
dominance.
Woolley begins by examining the cultural
implications of the expanding role of the
JMSDF, followed by the institutional dimension of the legal constraints imposed
by the Japanese constitution on JSDF activities. In subsequent chapters, he traces
the impact of strategic purpose on the
development of these forces as Japan accepted the role of defending its sea-lanes
out to one thousand miles. Woolley follows with an examination of the domestic and international implications of
Japan’s expanding capabilities and operations as it sent minesweepers to the Persian Gulf in 1991, and how the
incremental changes in Japan’s defense
policy over the last three decades resulted
in tacit international and domestic acceptance of its participation in
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peacekeeping operations. Woolley concludes with a valuable discussion of Japan’s changing defense posture and its
relevance to aiding the United States in
protecting shared vital interests in Asia.
Well researched and meticulously documented with an extensive bibliography,
this book is an excellent reference for
anyone wanting to understand Japanese
defense policy and the forces that affect
it. However, it is more than a book about
the development of the JMSDF in the last
three decades. It is also about the development of Japan’s national defense policy and the forces that move Japanese
policy makers. It is a concise treatise that
effectively uses maps and tables to help
the reader understand key points.
Thus, the reader should be cautioned
that the title of this book does not accurately convey its value as an examination
of the strengths and weaknesses of the
Japanese defense forces—not just the
JMSDF—nor does it suggest the richness
of the author’s analysis of Japanese policy
making. This book provides much more,
and it can serve as an excellent resource
for gaining insight into the most important bilateral relationship of the United
States.
ROBERT MORABITO

Commander, U.S. Navy
Naval War College

Lavell, Kit. Flying Black Ponies. Annapolis, Md.:
Naval Institute Press, 2000. 376pp. $32.95

Flying Black Ponies is an effective combination of combat narrative, squadron
history, and personal memoir, telling the
story of Light Attack Squadron 4 (VAL 4,
or the “Black Ponies”), a naval aviation
squadron stationed in the Mekong Delta
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during the Vietnam War. During most of
the war, the U.S. Navy made an intense
effort with its Mobile Riverine Force to
interdict enemy arms and supplies that
flowed, primarily from Cambodia, across
the Mekong Delta into the area surrounding Saigon. Kit Lavell’s book is a
readable account of the Black Ponies’ important role in this hazardous interdiction campaign.
The Mekong Delta is not an easy place to
conduct any type of military operation. It is
a lush, steaming, tangled waterscape of
swamps, soggy plains, and rice paddies
crisscrossed with thousands of miles of
rivers, streams, and canals. The canalinterdiction war in the Mekong was limited in 1968 in part by the inability to
sustain close air support. The “Swift
boats,” river patrol boats, SEAL teams,
and the overstretched squadron of Navy
attack helicopters (HAL 3, or the
“Seawolves”) that were already in place
clearly needed assistance. The new Commander, Naval Forces Vietnam, Vice Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., decided that
air firepower was needed that could
reach station quickly and remain there
for several hours. The Black Ponies became operational in the Mekong during
April 1969 in order to give fixed-wing
aircraft punch, mainly with five-inch
Zuni rockets, to the fight for control of
the strategic river delta.
The book follows VAL 4 from its commissioning in San Diego, in January
1969, until its last mission and decommissioning in April 1972. The narrative
also contains useful summaries of Navy
tactics in the Mekong Delta, briefly describing MARKET TIME, GAME WARDEN,
SEA LORDS, GIANT SLINGSHOT, DUFFLE
BAG, ACTOV, and other operations in
which the Black Ponies were involved.
Lavell also weaves numerous other
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elements of the squadron’s experiences
into his account. Lavell was one of the
Black Pony pilots, flying 234 combat missions in the OV-10 Bronco aircraft during his tour with VAL 4. He effectively
describes the frustration of being at the
very end of the line of the Navy’s support
and supply organization in Vietnam, and
of dealing with rear-echelon staff administrators. He also pays deserved tribute to
the enlisted maintenance and ordnance
crews who worked long hours in the heat
and humidity to keep the squadron aircraft safely airborne and armed. He portrays the sometimes humorous and
somewhat disrespectful escapades of junior officers, particularly as the pullout
from Vietnam neared in 1972.
Most importantly, however, this book is
about the pilots of VAL 4 and their combat experiences. In three years of flying in
the Mekong Delta, the squadron compiled a unique and impressive record.
The Black Ponies’ ability to “scramble”
when the Riverine Force made contact
with the enemy continually resulted in
direct air-ground firefights. The combat
action is sharply drawn, evoking the tension, complexity, and confusion of delivering air strikes, especially in close
proximity to friendly forces on the
ground. When strikes took place at night
and in bad weather (which they often
did), the descriptions are even more harrowing. Several of the stories of the aerial
fighting are effectively paired with personal memories of the same engagement
by other personnel involved—river patrol boat crews, SEAL teams, and
Riverine Force troops on the ground.
As Steven Coonts notes in his foreword,
Flying Black Ponies can be read as a characteristic example of the way America fights
its wars. Coonts describes the volunteers
that fought the air war—young men of

2

182

Calhoun: Flying Black Ponies,

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

blue-collar or decidedly middle-class
background, mostly from farms or small
towns. Their story is an important one,
and the first-person accounts of individual sacrifice and aircrew heroism are a
needed addition to the narrative of the
Navy’s nearly forgotten war in the Mekong
Delta.
WILLIAM M. CALHOUN

Naval War College

Gentile, Gian P. How Effective Is Strategic Bombing?
Lessons Learned from World War II to Kosovo. New
York: New York Univ. Press, 2001. 273pp. $36

The issue of strategic bombing’s effectiveness is vitally important to political
and military leaders. U.S. Air Force doctrine has argued for decades that
airpower’s ability to operate directly and
immediately at the strategic level of war
is its unique and defining characteristic—a characteristic that must be exploited. Many disagree, so the debates
have been long and heated.
Gian Gentile, a serving Army officer, now
adds to the literature on this important
subject. Unfortunately, he never really
comes to grips with the key issue of effectiveness implied by the title of his book.
Rather, he has chosen to replow some old
ground, looking anew at the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS), chartered
by President Franklin Roosevelt to examine and report on the effects of strategic
bombing in World War II. Measuring
bombing’s effectiveness and examining
the workings of the USSBS that studied
bomb effects are two different things.
The story of USSBS has been told before.
In many ways it is a typical tale of wartime America. A need is identified, resources and personnel are mobilized, vast
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amounts of energy and material are expended, and notable gains are achieved.
At the same time, the path to success is
not a straight line—there is much inefficiency, debate, and compromise. Sausage
is being made.
Gentile does not contest the findings of
USSBS. Indeed, virtually no one has attempted to do so in the five-plus decades
since they were released. The reason is
simple: no one has the time, stamina, resources, or expertise to review the mountain of data collected and analyzed by the
thousand individuals who conducted the
USSBS.
Instead, Gentile seeks to discredit the
survey’s findings by revealing flaws and
inconsistencies in the survey itself. Primarily, he argues that Army Air Forces
(AAF) leaders were so interested in forming a separate air force after the war that
they induced bias into the USSBS. He is
unable to make this charge stick. The
survey was led by noted industrialists,
bankers, economists, lawyers, and other
professionals, most of whom had had little or no direct involvement with aviation prior to their work with the survey.
Gentile admits that General Henry “Hap”
Arnold, the AAF commander, stressed to
these civilian leaders the need for objectivity, impartiality, and truth in the survey’s findings. Yet he treats such
admonitions as duplicitous, despite the
statement by the USSBS head that “at no
time has there been the slightest inclination to interfere with us.”
In truth, it is difficult to imagine that
men like John Kenneth Galbraith, Paul
Nitze, and George Ball could have been
manipulated and pressured to distort
their findings. Common sense and logic
tell us it is more likely that these
men—and their hundreds of colleagues
on the survey— examined thousands of
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